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Abstract 
The study estimates the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria using the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) 
approach proposed by Volden and Wiseman. The study deviates from the often controversial issue of 
astronomical remuneration of the legislators’- to assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the individual 
legislators. The findings show that on average, legislators with experience sponsored approximately 2.58 bills 
per head in the reviewed period, while those without legislative experience sponsored approximately 2.32 bills 
per head. This supports the views in the literature that longer serving members of the legislature tend to be more 
effective. Also, the LES ranking showed that out of the top 10 senators, eight were of the ruling Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (PDP) while two were of the now defunct All Nigeria’s Peoples Party. This also supports the 
unanimous findings in the literature that members of the dominant party tend to be more successful than 
members of the minority or opposition parties. With respect to individual senators effectiveness, Senator Victor 
Ndoma Egba, with legislative experience, and of the ruling PDP, was the most effective senator in the period 
reviewed.     
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1.    Introduction   
Since Nigeria returned to democratic system of government in 1999 after years of military rule, the operations of 
the legislature have often been in the spotlight for various reasons. Expectedly, the question of the cost of 
maintaining the two chambers of the National Assembly where there are 109 Senators and 360 House of 
Representatives members has often overshadowed other pertinent issues such as the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the legislators. Specifically, the perceived high remuneration of the Nigerian lawmakers which 
is believed to be enormous even when compared to the earnings of lawmakers in advanced democracies is often 
a matter of debate.  
 
However, this study deviates from this path and focuses on providing an insight into the performance of the 
legislature. Particularly, the emphasis is to examine the effectiveness of the individual legislators with a view to 
shedding light on their ability to provide appropriate representation for their respective constituencies. Following 
from this objective, the sole research question that this study seeks to answer is - How effective are Nigerian 
legislators?  
The remaining part of this study proceeds as follows: section two explains some legislative theories as well as 
some empirical results. Section three explains the methodology of this study while section four presents its 
results. Section five summarizes and concludes the study.  
 
 
2. Legislative Theories and Empirical Evidence     
2.1 Legislative Theories 
A number of theories have been put forward in explaining the operations of the legislature. These include the 
synoptic policy-phases theory, the agenda building theory, elite ideology theory, bureau-political theory, positive 
political theory, informational (chamber-dominated) theory, distributive committee theory and party-dominated 
committee theory. These theories are explained briefly with the goal of using them as a basis for providing an 
insight into the research question that this study aims to answer.   
The procedure of lawmaking according to the synoptic policy-phases theory is one of a well-ordered and well-
directed process of decision-making that gives direction to a country under the sponsorship of political bodies. 
Conversely, the proposition of the agenda building theory is that the process of lawmaking is not a well-
organized and direct process, but rather as the outcome of a societal process in which different parties with 
different ideas and interests clash. In particular, the agenda-building theory clarifies that lawmaking is a long and 
complex transformation-process upon which many different actors and factors can have an impact. The elite 
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ideology theory postulates that in most developing countries political elites try to transform their less developed 
societies through new ambitious legislations drafted without people’s participation. However, due to conflicting 
interests among the elite politicians, there are usually conflicts and stagnation in the legislative process.  
The bureau-political theory conceives lawmaking as a struggle between different sections (bureaus) within the 
government. For example, conflicts between developmental goals of economic growth and environmental 
protection may reflect in competition between the responsible ministries. The positive political theory describes 
law-making as a bargaining process where legislators negotiate with one another in order to facilitate their 
individual goals. To accomplish their aims, legislators often act within coalitions, thus the theory emphasizes the 
structure of legislative decision-making, the building of legislative coalitions and the strategies of legislative 
communication of statutory meaning.    
The informational (chamber-dominated) theory emphasizes the role of committees in the legislative process. 
Because the parent chamber depends on its committees to research about the potential impact of a particular 
legislation, information theorists conclude that the parent chamber has good grounds to make committees with a 
distribution of preferences similar to its own. The distributive committee theory holds that legislators self-select 
themselves into committees where the committee jurisdiction coincides with their constituency preferences. In 
this way, a legislator’s primary interest lies within the issues handled by the committees to which he belongs. For 
example, members from rural areas may tend to join an agriculture related committee. The party-dominated 
committee theory holds that legislative power lies with the political parties which inform and constrain 
committee members’ decisions through the party leadership. Therefore, a party’s delegation on committees will 
be representative of its delegation in the parent chamber so as to enhance the collective control of power by the 
party.  
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Following the review of legislative theories in the previous section, this part of the study provides some 
empirical evidence on legislative effectiveness. The goal here is twofold: First, reviewing previous studies will 
provide the source for the methodology used in assessing the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria. Second, 
reviewing previous studies will provide the basis for comparing the results in this study with findings from other 
studies.  
 
The unanimous view in the literature on legislative effectiveness is that the effectiveness of a legislator may be 
measured in different ways, including but not limited to the number of bills sponsored by the legislator, whether 
the bills see any action, whether the bills are reported from committee, whether they pass the chamber, the 
proportion of the bills sponsored that succeed, and whether bills sponsored by different members possessing 
similar characteristics are more likely to succeed.  
 
These indicators of measuring the effectiveness of legislators have been examined by different studies. Cox and 
McCubbins (1993) posit that bills sponsored by mainstream legislators are more likely to be successful either 
because the sponsor’s ideology sends a signal that a proposal reflects the preferences of the entire legislature or 
party median. The study also highlights that the role of the sponsor’s ideology may differ depending on the stage 
of the bill because parties play a central role in setting the floor agenda. This position lends credence to the 
party-dominated committee theory which holds that legislative power lies with the political parties. The study by 
Hall (1996) highlights that committee leaders tend to possess attributes and resources that contribute to their 
effectiveness in crafting and advancing policy proposals that are more likely to win the support of other 
legislators. This supports the informational (chamber-dominated) theory which stresses the role of committees in 
the legislative process. The importance of co-sponsoring of bills was examined by Wilson and Young (1997), 
arguing that the number of co-sponsors is one indicator of legislative effectiveness and that a long list of 
cosponsors is a clear indication that a bill has broad support across ideological and/or partisan lines. This view is 
closely linked with the positive political theory of legislature which sees law-making as a bargaining process 
where legislators bargain and form coalitions in order to facilitate their individual goals.     
 
The issue of longevity was stressed by Wawro (2000), stressing that longer serving members possess better 
information about the preferences and priorities of other members as well as better understanding of the 
legislative operations. Therefore, these should make them more effective. Also, the study argued that greater 
electoral pressures may suggest that junior members may be unusually active and possibly more success on 
matters of particular relevance to their constituencies. The study by Adler and Wilkerson (2005) emphasized the 
importance of bill contents and therefore suggested that bills be distinguished by their scope and urgency of 
required action. On his part, Krutz (2005) explained why some members’ bills are more likely to progress 
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through the legislative process than those of others, with members of the majority party tending to be more 
successful. Adler et al. (2005) noted that bills sponsored by legislators who are deemed to be experts in an issue 
area, whether by virtue of their roles as committee members, their seniority, and/or their prior profession, should 
be more successful. In ranking members of the US House of Representatives in terms of their effectiveness at 
moving bills, Volden and Wiseman (2009) categorized bills into commemorative/symbolic bill, (C), substantive 
bill (S) and substantively significant (SS) bill and calculated the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES). They 
argued and showed that at the foundations of legislative effectiveness are the three concepts of innate ability, 
acquired skill, and institutional positioning. Specifically, their results show high effectiveness of majority party 
members, women, and committee chairs.   
 
3. Methodology 
To examine the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria, our starting point is to rely on the proposition of the 
agenda-building theory which says that the legislative process is a long and complex process upon which many 
different actors and factors can have an impact. Therefore, we measure the effectiveness of Nigerian legislators 
in terms of how individually, they are able to introduce bills and push such bills through the complex legislative 
process of the Nigerian parliament.  
Specifically, we focus on the performance of senators between 2007 and 2008 for the simple reason that the 
early years of the return to democracy, that is the 4th National Assembly (1999-2003) and 5th National Assembly 
(2003-2007), were characterized by issues such as impeachments and other matters not promoting effective 
lawmaking. Our view is that by 2007 and 2008, there was relative stability in the legislature, thereby providing 
the much needed environment for effective lawmaking activities. In addition, difficulty with getting up to date 
data limited the time frame to 2008.  
Therefore, to measure the effectiveness of the senators in the chosen period, we apply the method proposed by 
Volden and Wiseman (2009) which they used to rank members of the US House of Representatives in terms of 
their effectiveness at moving bills through the legislative process. They categorized bills into 
commemorative/symbolic bill, (C), substantive bill (S) and substantively significant (SS) bill and calculated the 
Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) as shown in equation 1;  
                            (1) 
 
Where BILL is the number of bills that each member sponsored, AIC is the number of those bills that received 
action in committee, ABC is the number of the bills that receive action beyond committee, PASS is number of 
the bills subsequently passed, LAW is number of the bills that eventually became law and N is the total number 
of legislators. Within each of the five terms, commemorative bills are weighted by α, substantive bills by β, and 
substantively significant by . In the analysis, Volden and Wiseman (2009) assigned α = 1, β = 5 and  = 10 in 
order to show that significant legislation exerts ten times the weight on the LES as commemorative legislation 
and twice as much as normal substantive legislation. The weights were chosen to reflect the view that passing a 
substantively significant bill is a stronger indicator of legislative effectiveness than passing general substantive 
legislation; and likewise, that passing substantive legislation is a stronger indicator of legislative effectiveness 
than passing commemorative/symbolic legislation.  
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Given that bills in the Nigerian legislature are not classified into commemorative, substantive and substantively 
significant bills, we design a legislative effectiveness framework as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Source: Authors  
 
From Figure 1 above, based on the party-dominated theory that holds that legislative power lies with the political 
parties which inform and constrain its members’ decisions through party influence, we first establish the 
legislator’s party affiliation. Volden and Wiseman (2009) also posit that several theories have conceived 
different mechanisms of partisan influence with implications for the prospects of party members’ legislative 
effectiveness. Furthermore, we seek to know if the senator has legislative experience or not, as this may play an 
important role in the level of effectiveness. The essence of emphasizing legislative experience is because 
empirical findings suggest that as legislators spend more time in the parliament, they are expected to become 
better and more effective at lawmaking (Fiorina 1997, Mayhew 1974)1. Also, this is in line with Wawro (2000) 
who argued that longer serving members usually possess better information about the preferences and priorities 
of other members as well as better understanding of the legislative operations and are therefore expected to be 
more effective. In addition, legislators who served at the State level legislature before ascending to the national 
parliament are believed to have acquired some experience that will aid their performance at the national level 
(Peterson, 1995)2.  
 
Consequently, we modify the LES approach by Volden and Wiseman (2009) as shown in equation 2;  
                           (2)  
Where BILL, AIC, ABC, PASS, LAW and N are as defined earlier.  To differentiate the importance of each 
stage of the legislative process, we assign weights as 
                                                 
1
 Cited in Volden and Wiseman (2009:23) 
2
 Cited in Volden and Wiseman (2009:24) 
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follows; ;  The weights were chosen to reflect the 
effectiveness of a senator from when he/she sponsors a bill to when the bill is eventually passed. In other words, 
a weight of two means that a bill that the senate recommends for further scrutiny in a committee is more 
important than a bill that was introduced but does not get past that stage. The importance of sending a bill to the 
committee is in line with the postulation of the information theory of legislative organization that the parent 
chamber relies on its committees to research about the potential impact of legislation.  
Similarly, a weight of three implies that a bill that passes out of the committee is more important than the one 
that did not get beyond the committee stage. Also, a weight of four means that the bill that the committee 
recommends for debate or received attention in the senate is more important than a bill that did not get positive 
recommendation by the committee. Finally, the weight of five means that the bill that get passed into law is more 
important than the bill that was debated but not passed.  
Results     
4.1 Legislative Experience and Ability to Sponsor Bills   
Table 1 juxtaposes the number of bills sponsored by senators with their legislative experience or lack thereof. Of 
the 109 senators, only 43 or 39.5 percent sponsored bills in the period under review, with 24 or 56 percent of the 
43 senators that sponsored bills having legislative experience, that is, they were either returning senators or were 
legislators at the State level before ascending to the National Assembly. The remaining 19 senators or 44 percent 
of the 43 senators that sponsored bills in the period did not have any legislative experience. Therefore, of the 106 
bills sponsored between 2007 and 2008, 62 or 58 percent were sponsored by senators with legislative experience 
while 44 or 42 percent of the total bills were sponsored by senators without legislative experience. The 
implication of this is that legislators with experience sponsored approximately 2.58 bills per head in the period 
while those without legislative experience sponsored about 2.32 bills per head. This confirms the finding of 
Wawro (2000) that longer serving members of the legislature tend to be more effective. 
Table 1: Legislative Experience and Ability to Sponsor Bills 
 No. of Senators No. of Bills 
Sponsored 
No. of Bills Sponsored 
Per Head 
Legislative Experience  24       62 2.58 
No Legislative Experience 19      44 2.32 
 
43     106  
Source: Authors’ Compilation                    
4.2 Legislative Effectiveness Score  
In the period 2007 and 2008, a total of 137 bills were sponsored in the senate, of which 106 or 77 percent were 
sponsored by senators while the remaining bills were sponsored by the executive arm of government. The bills 
sponsored by the senators were at different stages and we use these to calculate the LES of the individual 
senators. As stated earlier, the period 2007 to 2008 is the preferred period because the early phase of the 
democratic experience was considered as a learning process. Also, party intrigues as well as individual interests 
led to constant impeachments while the core business of lawmaking was relegated to the background.  
 
Table 2 shows the number of bills sponsored by senators and the different stages of such bills. Senator Victor 
Ndoma Egba sponsored 12 or approximately 11 percent of the 106 bills put forward in the period. Of these bills, 
four were at the committee stage, seven at first reading and one got to the third reading stage. Senator Sylvester 
N. Anyanwu who sponsored six bills had all of them at the first reading stage while four of the six bills 
sponsored by Gbemi Ruqayyah Saraki were at first reading and two at the committee stage.  
 
Senators Iyabo Obasanjo, Grace Folashade Bent and Ike Ekweremadu all sponsored five bills in the period. 
However, while Iyabo Obasanjo and Grace Folashade Bent had four of their bills at the first reading stage and 
one at the committee level, Senator Ike Ekweremadu had two of the bills at the committee stage and three at the 
first reading stage. At the rear of the log are 18 senators who all sponsored one bill each in the period, but while 
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13 of them saw their bills getting to the first reading stage, five of them had their bills sent to the different 
committees.  
Table 2: Bills Sponsored by Senators and Stages   
  
Senator 
No. of Bills 
Sponsored  
Committee 
Stage 
First  
Reading 
Second  
Reading  
Third  
Reading 
1 Victor Ndoma Egba  12  4  7  0  1  
2 Sylvester N. Anyanwu 6 0 6 0 0 
3 Gbemi R. Saraki 6 2 4 0 0 
4 Iyabo Obasanjo 5 1 4 0 0 
5 Grace Folashade Bent 5 1 4 0 0 
6 Ike Ekweremadu 5 2 3 0 0 
7 Folarin T. Kolawole 4 1 3 0 0 
8 Abubakar Umar Gada 4 2 2 0 0 
9 Bassey Ewa Henshaw 3 1 2 0 0 
10 Anyogu Eze 3 1 2 0 0 
11 Felix K. Bajomo 3 1 2 0 0 
12 Ganiyu O. Solomon 3 1 2 0 0 
13 Agbo A. Ooduma 3 1 2 0 0 
14 Uche Chukwumerije 3 2 1 0 0 
15 Chris Anyanwu 3 2 1 0 0 
16 Ahmed Ibrahim Lawan 2 0 2 0 0 
17 Mohammed. A. Bello 2 0 2 0 0 
18 Bode Olajumoje 2 0 2 0 0 
19 Aloysius A. Etok 2 0 2 0 0 
20 Ehigie E. Uzamere 2 0 2 0 0 
21 Lokpobiri Heineken  2 0 2 0 0 
22 Eme Ufot Ekaette 2 1 1 0 0 
23 Osita B. Izunaso 2 1 1 0 0 
24 Manzo G. Anthony 2 1 1 0 0 
25 Joel D. Ikenya 2 2 0 0 0 
26 Nkechi J. Nwaogu 1 0 1 0 0 
27 Sahabi Alhaji Ya’u 1 0 1 0 0 
28 Hosea O. Ehinlawo 1 0 1 0 0 
29 Zaynab A. Kure 1 0 1 0 0 
30 George T. Sekibo 1 0 1 0 0 
31 Umar Dahiru 1 0 1 0 0 
32 Joy I. Emodi 1 0 1 0 0 
33 Abubakar A. Bagudu 1 0 1 0 0 
34 Mohammed K. Jibril 1 0 1 0 0 
35 Omar A. Hambagda 1 0 1 0 0 
36 Ramoni O. Mustapha 1 0 1 0 0 
37 Abubakar Sodangi 1 0 1 0 0 
38 Gbenga Ogunniya 1 0 1 0 0 
39 Simeon O. Oduoye 1 1 0 0 0 
40 Garba Yakubu Lado 1 1 0 0 0 
41 Joseph I. Akaagerger 1 1 0 0 0 
42 Festus Bode Ola 1 1 0 0 0 
43 John N. Shagaya 1 1 0 0 0 
Source: Compiled from http://www.nigeriansenate.org/ at different times in the month of July 2012. 
Table 3 shows the results of the LES with Senator Victor Ndoma Egba the most effective having the highest LES 
of 2.8776. He was followed by Senator Sylvester Anyanwu who scored 2.2748 and Gbemi R. Saraki 1.4407. 
Senators Iyabo Obasanjo and Grace Folashade Bent were joint 4th with LES of 1.3270 each, while Senator Ike 
Ekweremadu followed with LES of 1.1374. In sum, of the top 10 senators, eight were of the ruling Peoples’ 
Democratic Party while two were of the opposition All Nigeria’s Peoples Party (now defunct). When the top 20 
senators are considered, 16 were of the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party while four were of the opposition 
political parties. This confirms results in the literature such as Krutz 2005 where members of the majority party 
tend to be more successful. 
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With respect to legislative experience or lack thereof, of the top 10 most effective senators, five of them had 
legislative experience while the other five did not have legislative experience. This supports the result of Volden 
and Wiseman (2009) who found that in the 98th Congress of the US, three of the top six legislators had 
legislative experience while the other three did not have experience. The implication of this is that while 
legislative experience is necessary, it may not be sufficient since other factors such as innate ability, party 
influence, cultivation of skill set and institutional position are important 
Table 3: Legislative Effectiveness Score   
 
 
Senator 
Political  
Party* 
Legislative 
Experience 
Legislative 
Effectiveness Score  
1 Victor Ndoma Egba PDP Yes 2.8776 
2 Sylvester N. Anyanwu PDP No 2.2748 
3 Gbemi R. Saraki PDP Yes 1.4407 
4 Iyabo Obasanjo PDP No 1.3270 
5 Grace Folashade Bent PDP No 1.3270 
6 Ike Ekweremadu PDP Yes 1.1374 
7 Folarin T. Kolawole PDP Yes 1.0237 
8 Abubakar Umar Gada PDP No 0.8341 
9 Ahmed Ibrahim Lawan ANPP Yes 0.7583 
10 Mohammed. A. Bello ANPP No 0.7583 
11 Bode Olajumoje PDP No 0.7583 
12 Aloysius A. Etok PDP No 0.7583 
13 Ehigie E. Uzamere PDP n/a 0.7583 
14 Lokpobiri Heineken  PDP Yes 0.7583 
15 Bassey Ewa Henshaw PDP Yes 0.7203 
16 Anyogu Eze PDP No 0.7203 
17 Felix K. Bajomo PDP No 0.7203 
18 Ganiyu O. Solomon AC Yes 0.7203 
19 Agbo A. Ooduma PDP Yes 0.7203 
20 Uche Chukwumerije PPA Yes 0.5308 
21 Chris Anyanwu PDP n/a 0.5308 
22 Eme Ufot Ekaette PDP No 0.4170 
23 Osita B. Izunaso PDP Yes 0.4170 
24 Manzo G. Anthony PDP n/a 0.4170 
25 Nkechi J. Nwaogu PDP Yes 0.3791 
26 Sahabi Alhaji Ya’u PDP n/a 0.3791 
27 Hosea O. Ehinlawo PDP Yes 0.3791 
28 Zaynab A. Kure PDP No 0.3791 
29 George T. Sekibo PDP Yes 0.3791 
30 Umar Dahiru PDP Yes 0.3791 
31 Joy I. Emodi PDP Yes 0.3791 
32 Abubakar A. Bagudu PDP No 0.3791 
33 Mohammed K. Jibril PDP No 0.3791 
34 Omar A. Hambagda ANPP Yes 0.3791 
35 Ramoni O. Mustapha PDP Yes 0.3791 
36 Abubakar Sodangi PDP Yes 0.3791 
37 Gbenga Ogunniya PDP Yes 0.3791 
38 Joel D. Ikenya PDP Yes 0.2275 
39 Simeon O. Oduoye PDP No 0.1137 
40 Garba Yakubu Lado PDP Yes 0.1137 
41 Joseph I. Akaagerger PDP No 0.1137 
42 Festus Bode Ola AC No 0.1137 
43 John N. Shagaya PDP No 0.1137 
Source: Authors  
*The ANPP (All Nigeria’s Peoples Party) and the AC (Action Congress) are now defunct 
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5. Summary, Conclusions and Limitations of the Study 
Using the Volden-Wise Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) approach, the study examines the effectiveness of 
individual legislators in Nigeria, with focus on senators between 2007 and 2008. The results show that of the 109 
senators, only 43 or 39.5 percent sponsored bills in the period while of the top 10 senators, eight were of the 
ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party while two were of the defunct All Nigeria’s Peoples Party. If the top 20 
senators are considered, 16 were of the ruling party and four of the opposition parties. When legislative 
experience or lack thereof is considered, five of the top 10 legislators had legislative experience while the 
remaining five did not have legislative experience. With respect to individual senators, the LES ranking showed 
that Senator Victor Ndoma Egba, with legislative experience and of the Peoples Democratic Party was the most 
effective senator in the period.   
Based on the findings, a number of conclusions can be made: First, the study has been able to provide an insight 
into measuring the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria. Second, the results support outcomes of studies 
reviewed in the literature, implying that legislative attributes in the Nigerian senate bears semblance with other 
countries. Third, if less than half of the senators were actively involved in sponsoring of bills in the reviewed 
period, then there is need for drastic improvement in senators’ performances in this regard.   
The study is however characterized by a number of limitations. First, in measuring legislative effectiveness, we 
only considered the bills sponsored by senators. However, other factors such as ability to move motions, 
contribution to debates, performance in committees and oversight functions, etc., are also valid means of 
ascertaining the effectiveness of legislators. Also, for a legislator occupying leadership position, for example the 
Senate president or Speaker of the House of Representatives, using the sponsoring of bills as the sole indicator of 
measuring performance may not be reflective of the effectiveness of such a legislator. Second, upcoming studies 
may devote attention to the contents of the bills sponsored by legislators in line with the view of Adler and 
Wilkerson (2005). Third, there is need to use more recent data in prospective studies.    
 
 
These limitations notwithstanding, the study has attempted to provide an insight into the effectiveness of 
individual senators in Nigeria. Future studies may therefore endeavor to address some or all of the identified 
shortcomings.  
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